George Berkeley's Manuscript Introduction

A piece of philosophical history from the Library of Trinity College Dublin's manuscript collection.

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George Berkeley (1685-1753), Robert Home, 1782, From the collection of: The Library of Trinity College Dublin
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George Berkeley (1685–1753) was an Irish bishop and philosopher. He arrived at Trinity College Dublin as a student in 1700. He received the B.A. in 1704 and was elected Fellow in 1707. He maintained his affiliation with the College until 1724, when he resigned to become dean of the Protestant cathedral at Derry.

Observation in a voyage through the kingdom of Ireland, p. 71 (1681) by Thomas DingleyThe Library of Trinity College Dublin

This drawing of Trinity dates from c. 1681, and shows the College as Berkeley would have known it.

Courtesy of the National Library of Ireland.

A bird's-eye perspective plan of Trinity College park and gardens (1780) by Samuel ByronThe Library of Trinity College Dublin

Trinity College Dublin has expanded considerably since Berkeley's time. This representation from 1780 shows many features that would have been familiar to Berkeley, but several that were built after his tenure, such as the Provost's House, bell tower and dining hall.

Thomas Burgh's library was the greatest addition to College during Berkeley's time in Trinity, with construction beginning in 1712 and continuing until 1732; Berkeley himself had left in 1724.
Berkeley had acted as the College's Librarian for a period in 1709. The modern Berkeley Library, considered the finest Brutalist-style building in Ireland, is named in his honour.

George Berkeley, James Latham, 1743, From the collection of: The Library of Trinity College Dublin
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In addition to serving as College Librarian, Berkeley was a lecturer in Greek, Hebrew, and divinity, and also Junior Dean and Senior Proctor.

George Berkeley, Francis Bindon, 1733/1765, From the collection of: The Library of Trinity College Dublin
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During his time at Trinity, Berkeley composed his two most famous philosophical works, A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710) and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713).

A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (title page) (1710) by George BerkeleyThe Library of Trinity College Dublin

The Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge was published in Dublin in 1710. This was the first public presentation of Berkeley’s philosophical theories.

The Chapman Manuscript (cover) (1708) by George BerkeleyThe Library of Trinity College Dublin

The Manuscript Introduction

This book is known as the Chapman manuscript, so-called because it was donated to the Trinity College library by J. B. Chapman in 1858. It contains a manuscript version of the Introduction to Berkeley’s Principles, in Berkeley’s own handwriting, which differs in important ways from the published version and contains philosophical ideas not found in Berkeley’s published writings.

George Berkeley's Manuscript Introduction (folio 3, recto) (1708) by George BerkeleyThe Library of Trinity College Dublin

Although some of the text is included in the edition of Berkeley’s Works edited by A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (published 1948–1957), this version does not indicate the numerous markings, insertions, deletions, and marginal comments that appear in the manuscript. These can be found only in the diplomatic edition prepared by Bertil Belfrage, which was printed in a limited run of only 500 copies in 1987.

George Berkeley's Manuscript Introduction (folio 20, recto) (1708) by George BerkeleyThe Library of Trinity College Dublin

The original layer of text in the manuscript is written in careful, neat handwriting, using the recto (right hand) pages only.

George Berkeley's Manuscript Introduction (folio 20, verso) (1708) by George BerkeleyThe Library of Trinity College Dublin

Corrections are made on the verso (left hand) page.

The fact that the manuscript is prepared in this way likely indicates that Berkeley had initially planned to send this text to be printed, but later decided that it needed to be rewritten.

Folio 20 provides an especially striking example: here Berkeley has rewritten entire paragraphs on the verso page.

George Berkeley's Manuscript Introduction (folio 20, recto) (1708) by George BerkeleyThe Library of Trinity College Dublin

The line down the right margin of the recto of folio 20 is apparently intended to indicate the rejection of this entire passage, to be replaced by the text written on the verso page.

George Berkeley's Manuscript Introduction (folio 21, recto) (1708) by George BerkeleyThe Library of Trinity College Dublin

The lengthy section Berkeley has marked for omission, beginning on folio 20, discusses in detail two examples that are used to illustrate Berkeley’s view that not every meaningful word stands for an idea. The first example is the proposition ‘Melampus is an animal’. (‘Proposition’ is Berkeley’s word for a sentence.) Regarding the word ‘animal’ in this example, Berkeley writes: “Nor does it as used in that Proposition stand for any Idea [at all] at all. All that I intend to signify thereby being only this. That the particular [creature] thing I call Melampus has a right to be called by the name animal.”

This example does not appear anywhere in the published text.

George Berkeley's Manuscript Introduction (folio 22, recto) (1708) by George BerkeleyThe Library of Trinity College Dublin

The second example Berkeley gives in this passage is the Biblical asssertion “[that] the good things which God hath prepared for them that love him are such as Eye hath not seen nor Ear heard nor hath it enter’d into the Heart of Man to conceive.” According to Berkeley, no one has any idea corresponding to the words ‘good things’ in this promise yet it is meaningful.

A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (page 31) (1710) by George BerkeleyThe Library of Trinity College Dublin

In the manuscript, there is a lengthy discussion, spanning folios 22–24, of how words like ‘good thing’ and ‘reward’ are able to influence our feelings and actions without standing for ideas. In the published version this detailed discussion has been reduced to a single rhetorical question.

George Berkeley's Manuscript Introduction (folio 26, recto) (1708) by George BerkeleyThe Library of Trinity College Dublin

Perhaps the most intriguing section of the manuscript is this discussion on the bottom of folio 25 and top of folio 26. Berkeley seems to have been particularly emphatic in rejecting this, drawing a double line down the margin and scribbling out the text.

George Berkeley's Manuscript Introduction (folio 25, recto) (1708) by George BerkeleyThe Library of Trinity College Dublin

The beginning of this discussion originally read, “I ask any man whether when he tells another that such an Action is Honourable ... whether this be not his full Purpose namely that those words should excite in the mind of the hearer an esteem of that particular action and stirr him up to the performance of it?”

Some scholars have seen this passage as offering an emotivist theory of moral language. Emotivism is a theory, popular in the early 20th century, which holds that the use of moral language does not attempt to state truths but only to express emotions and to influence the emotions and actions of others. If Berkeley is advocating such a view, he may have been the first to do so.

We do not know why Berkeley rejected this passage. Moral language is not discussed in the published Introduction

Credits: Story

This exhibition was curated by Dr Kenneth L. Pearce, Ussher Assistant Professor in Berkeley Studies (Early Modern Philosophy), Trinity College Dublin.

Technical support provided by Greg Sheaf, the Library of Trinity College Dublin.

Photography by Gill Whelan, Digital Resources and Imaging Services, the Library of Trinity College Dublin.

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